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Fisher: The Internal Revenue Service Collects from an Innocent Spouse in

THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE COLLECTS FROM AN

INNOCENT SPOUSE IN United States v. Craft:' COULD
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES BE NEXT?
"So they are no longer two, but
one. Therefore what God has joined
'2
together, let man not separate.
I. INTRODUCTION

In Blue Canyon Limited v. United States,3 a limited partnership
brought suit to prevent a federal tax lien4 from attaching to four parcels
of real property it received from the partnership's former general
partners, Paul and Winnifred Christensen. The Internal Revenue
Service 5 made an assessment against the Christensens for unpaid income
taxes and interest of more than $560,000.6 The U.S. District Court for
the District of Utah properly held that the United States did not have a
valid lien against the real property.7
In United States v. Craft, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Don
Craft had sufficient individual rights in property held as tenants by the

I United States v. Craft, 122 S.Ct. 1414 (2002).
2 Matthew 19:6 (New International Version).
3 Blue Canyon Ltd. v. United States, No. 90-C-850W, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2270 (D.
Utah Feb. 6, 1992).
4 The section providing for federal tax liens under the Internal Revenue Code is 26 U.S.C. §
6321 (2002). Section 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty,
together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.
I.R.C. § 6321 (2000).
5 The Internal Revenue Service is "[t]he branch of the U.S. Treasury Department
responsible for administering the Internal Revenue Code and providing taxpayer education."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 821 (7th ed. 1999).

6 Blue Canyon, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2270 at *13.
7 Id. at * 16. The United States argued that the partnership held the property as nominee for
the Christensens and that the property had been fraudulently conveyed to the partnership. Id. at * 1.
The court recognized that the Christensens had substantial control over the partnership and received
substantial benefits from the partnership assets. Id. at * 14.
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entirety 8 to allow a federal tax lien to reach it. 9 A court extending the
holding of Craft, however, might find that the Christensens, as general
partners, had sufficient rights to the property to allow a federal tax lien

to reach it.' 0 The effect of such a ruling would be to prevent blameless
partners from conveying the property. or from retaining all of the
proceeds from disposition."
Part II of this Note discusses tenancy by the entirety, the history of

the federal tax lien statute, and how federal courts have interpreted the
federal tax lien statute.1 2 Part III discusses the events leading up to the

Craft lawsuit, considers the Craft lawsuit itself, and examines the
subsequent court decisions.13
Finally, Part IV analyzes whether
entrepreneurs carrying on as unincorporated businesses and closely held
corporations have sufficiently similar rights to tenants by the
entirety to
14
setting.
business
the
in
applied
be
to
holding
Craft
the
allow
II.BACKGROUND

A. Tenancy by the Entirety

Tenancy by the entirety is a method of owning real property in
which a husband and wife are considered to hold property as a single

entity with a right of survivorship for the surviving spouse.

5

The entity

8 Tenancy by the entirety is defined as "[a] joint tenancy that arises between a husband and
wife when a single instrument conveys realty to both of them but nothing is said in the deed or will
about the character of their ownership." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (7th ed. 1999).
9 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1425 (2002).
10 See id. at 1429 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the logic of the Court's opinion
could be extended to allow federal tax liens resulting from the liability of an individual partner to
reach partnership property). But see id. at 1424 (noting that a federal tax lien may attach to
individual partner's interest in the partnership).
I IId. at 639. In Craft, a sale of the property held to be subject to the tax lien was prevented.
Id. The Internal Revenue Service was "undoubtedly entitled to any proceeds that Mr. Craft received
or to which he was entitled from the 1989 conveyance of the tenancy by the entirety property ..
Id. at 1426 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12 See infra notes 15 through 52 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 53 through Ill and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1429 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (illustrating the potential
far-reaching implications of the decision under partnership law).
15

JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 323 (4th ed. 1998).

Tenancy by the

entireties is like joint tenancy in that each requires unity of time, title, interest and possession, but
differs in several ways including the requirement that the joint owners must be husband and wife.
Id. at 322-23. Spouses may terminate a joint tenancy by unilaterally conveying a share of the
property to a third party; spouses cannot unilaterally convey any interest in property held as tenants
by the entirety. Id. at 323. Spouses may seek judicial partition of a joint tenancy; neither spouse
may seek judicial partition of property held as tenants by the entirety. Id.
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is a legal fiction similar to partnerships, corporations and limited liability
companies. 1 6 A spouse must obtain the other spouse's consent to
originated in English
alienate or encumber the property.' 7 The tenancy
8
common law no later than the fifteenth century.1
The American colonies and early states generally adopted tenancy
by the entireties from the English common law. 19 The rise of the
women's rights movement in the nineteenth century caused many states
to abolish tenancy by the entirety and deterred other states from ever
adopting the tenancy.20 Currently, spouses may own property as tenants
by the entirety in. twenty-four states, the Virgin Islands and the District
of Columbia.2 '
B. History and Scope of the Federal Tax Lien Statute
Congress first authorized the government to place liens on the
assets of delinquent taxpayers in 1865.22 Congress enacted the current
federal tax lien statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6321, in 1954. The statute creates
16 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1432.
17 Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties
Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 MO. L. REV. 839, 842 (1995).
18 Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002) (No. 00-1831).
For a detailed discussion of the history of tenancy by the entirety including its origins in English
common law see John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35 (1997).
19 Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002) (No. 00-1831).
20 Johnson, supra note 17, at 843. Professor Dukeminier discussed the Married Women's
Property Acts, which were enacted to protect wives' property and to provide legal autonomy:
Beginning with Mississippi in 1839, all common law property states had, by the end of
the nineteenth century, enacted Married Women's Property Acts, These statutes
removed the disabilities of coverture and gave a married woman, like a single woman,
control over all her property. Such property was her separate property, immune from her
husband's debts.
DUKEMINIER, supra note 15, at 363.
21 Brief for the United States at 26; United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002) (No. 001831). The states that currently recognize tenancy by the entirety are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Id. at 26 n.15. Ohio allowed tenancies by the
entirety to be created from 1972 to 1985. Id. Hawaii allows non-married persons (parent and child,
for example) to create a tenancy by the entirety upon registering as reciprocal beneficiaries.
DUKEMINIER, supra note 15, at 323 n.3.
22 13 Stat. 469 (1865). The statute provided that "if any person, bank association, company,
or corporation, liable to pay any duty, shall neglect or refuse to pay the same after demand, the
amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States from the time it was due until paid." 13 Stat.
469, 470-71 (1865). Subsequent revisions of the federal tax lien statute were 14 Stat. 98 (1866), 20
Stat. 327 (1879), 37 Stat. 1016 (1913), 43 Stat. 994 (1925), 45 Stat. 791 (1928), and 53 Stat. 444
(1939).
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liens in favor of the United States upon any property and rights to
property of persons who neglect or refuse to pay delinquent federal taxes
upon demand.23 In 1954, Congress considered, but did not enact, an
amendment to the federal tax lien statute that would have specifically
included entireties property among the types of property to which a lien
could attach.24
United States v. Bess 25 was the first of three U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that generally defined the scope of the federal tax lien statute.
In Bess, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the federal tax lien
statute does not create property rights, but merely attaches to property
rights that exist under state law.26 In Aquilino v. United States,27 the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that state law controls in determining
the legal interest in property that might be subject to a tax lien. 2 ' The
U.S. Supreme Court noted in United States v. National Bank of
Commerce that "Congress
meant to reach every interest in property that
29
have."
might
taxpayer
a

23 I.R.C. § 6321 (2000).
24 See H. R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A406 (1954) (noting that proponents of the proposed
amendment to the federal tax lien statute intended the amendment to include interests held as
tenants by the entirety); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 575 (1954) (indicating that the proposed
amendment would have provided that a federal tax lien could attach to property held as a tenant by
the entirety). Opponents of extending the reach of the federal tax lien statute argue that the
amendment was proposed because the Internal Revenue Service had been unsuccessful in
convincing federal courts to stretch the scope of the statute. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 11,
United States v. Craft, 122 S.Ct. 1414 (2002) (No. 00-1831). They view the defeat of the proposed
amendment as evidence that Congress did not intend to interfere with the statute's interpretation by
the federal courts. Id. But see Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1425 (arguing that failed legislative proposals are
not a good way to measure legislative intent and that the proposed amendment may have been
defeated because members of Congress believed that property held as tenants by the entirety was
already within the scope of the federal tax statute as enacted).
25 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
26 Id. at 55. The Internal Revenue Service sought to recover the payment of unpaid taxes
due by Molly Bess's husband from the proceeds she received from life insurance policies upon his
death. Id. at 52-53. The U.S. Supreme Court limited the attachment of the lien to only the cash
surrender value of the policies at the time of the insured's death because the insured did not have a
property right in the death benefit. Id. at 55-56.
27 Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
28 Id. at 513. The petitioners and the Internal Revenue Service were competing for funds
held by a county clerk on behalf of a restaurant owner. Id. at 510. The petitioners' claim resulted
from a mechanic's lien; the federal tax lien resulted from unpaid social security and federal
withholding taxes. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the New York Court of
Appeals to determine whether, under state law, the restaurant owner had property rights in the
deposited funds. Id. at 515-16.
29 United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720 (1985).
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C. Federal Tenancy-by-the-Entirety Cases
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Craft, Justice Thomas

noted that "[f]or more than 50 years, every federal court reviewing
tenancies by the entirety in States with a similar understanding of
tenancy by the entirety as Michigan has concluded that a federal tax lien
cannot attach to such property to satisfy an individual spouse's tax
liability."30

In Shaw v. United States,3 1 for example, the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Michigan considered whether a federal
tax lien against one spouse could attach to property held as tenants by

the entirety under Michigan law. The Shaw court acknowledged that it
was bound by state property law and upheld the "peculiar
nature of the
32
Court.,
Supreme
Michigan
the
by
estate as interpreted
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered Pitts v. United States.33 In Pitts, the Internal Revenue
Service attempted to attach a federal tax lien against only George Pitts to
notes that George and Ellen Pitts received in exchange for property
owned as tenants by the entirety.34 The Pitts court indicated that the lien
could not 35attach to the notes if the notes were entireties property under
state law.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a
30 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1431 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Cole v.
Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that the federal government had no valid claim
against real property held as tenants by the entirety); Benson v. United States, 442 F.2d 1221 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (recognizing that entireties property cannot be subjected to a tax lien for the debt of one
tenant); United States v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1958) (concluding
that a federal tax lien may not attach to entireties property to satisfy the tax obligations of one
spouse) ; Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952) (holding that the property of an innocent
spouse may not be taken to satisfy the unpaid tax debt of a delinquent spouse); United States v.
Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding that a federal tax lien resulting from a husband's
unpaid taxes did not attach to entireties property); United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193
(E.D. Mich. 1945) (noting that the Federal Revenue Act provided no means to use entireties
property to collect taxes due from one person alone).
31 Shaw v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mich. 1939).
32 Id. at 245. For a discussion of the "peculiar nature," see supra notes 15 through 21 and
accompanying text.
33 Pitts v. United States, 946 F.2d 1569 (4th Cir. 1991), certifying questions to 408 S.E.2d
901 (Va. 1991).
34 Id. at 1570.
35 Id. at 1571-72. The Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that proceeds from the sale of
entireties property are generally also held as entireties property. Oliver v. Givens, 129 S.E.2d 661,
663 (Va. 1963). The Internal Revenue Service argued that the Oliver holding should be interpreted
to apply only to cash proceeds. Pitts, 946 F.2d at 1570. Ellen Pitts argued that Oliver should be
interpreted broadly enough to apply to the notes. Id. at 1570. Because state law determined
whether the notes were held as tenants by the entirety, and this determination would be dispositive
in the case, the Pitts court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id. at 1571-72.
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similar issue in Internal Revenue Service v. Gaster.3 6 In Gaster, the
Internal Revenue Service attempted to collect proceeds from a bank
account jointly owned by the Gasters. 37 The Gaster court acknowledged
that the federal tax lien could not reach the account if the Gasters owned
the account as tenants by the entirety. 38
D. U.S. Supreme Court State-Law Legal Fiction Cases
While the lower federal courts were consistently holding that
federal tax liens could not attach to property held as tenants by the
entirety, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a line of cases in which it
found property or rights to property where state-law legal fictions
determined that none existed.39 In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided United States v. Mitchell.40 In Mitchell, a wife in Louisiana, a
community property 41 state, made a statutory election that exonerated
her from community debts incurred during her marriage.42 The Court
held that the renouncing spouse remained liable for federal income tax
on the community income despite the fact that she was not liable to
creditors under state law.43
36 Internal Revenue Serv. v. Gaster, 42 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1994).
37 Id. at 789.
38 Id. at 791. The Court noted that even if the lien was otherwise properly attached:
[U]nder Delaware law, the IRS would not be entitled to the money in the account if the
Gasters owned the account as tenants by the entireties since both Donald and Mary Ann
Gaster would be "seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during
their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the
joint act of both husband and wife."
Id. (quoting Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978)). The case was
ultimately decided on other grounds. Id. at 795.
39 See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (holding that federal law determines
whether state-delineated rights qualify as property or rights to property under the federal tax lien
statute); United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994) (holding that the disclaimer of a remainder
interest in a trust is subject to federal gift taxation); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971)
(holding that a spouse is personally liable for federal income tax on community income despite
statutorily electing to renounce community gains).
40 United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
41 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999). Community property is defined as
"[p]roperty owned in common by husband and wife as a result of its having been acquired during
the marriage by means other than an inheritance or gift to one spouse, each spouse holding a onehalf interest in the property." Id. The eight states with community property systems are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. DUKEMINIER, supra
note 15, at 397.
42 Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 191. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2410 (repealed 1980) provided that
"[b]oth the wife and her heirs or assigns have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves
from the debts contracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership or community of
gains."
43 Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 205. The Court considered the arguments opposing attachment and
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The U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Irvine44 in 1994.
In Irvine, Sally Ordway Irvine disclaimed her five-sixteenths interest in
the principal of a trust established by her grandfather.4 5 The issue in the
case was whether Ms. Irvine was liable for federal gift tax as a result of
the disclaimer.4 6 The Court held that the disclaimer created federal gift
tax liability for Ms. Irvine despite the state-law fiction that she never
received the property.47
Five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with another
disclaimer issue in Drye v. United States.48 In Drye, the Internal
Revenue Service had attached tax liens against all of Rohn Drye's
property at the time of his mother's death.49 Mr. Drye was the sole heir
to his mother's estate but disclaimed the inheritance. 50 The Court faced
the issue of whether the disclaimer prevented the federal tax lien from
attaching to the inheritance) 1 Relying in part on Mitchell and Irvine, the
Court concluded that the lien had attached to the inheritance, holding
that federal law determines whether state-delineated rights qualify as

concluded:
[T]his right of the wife to renounce or repudiate must not be misconstrued as an
indication that she had never owned and possessed her share .... [A]n exempt status
under state law does not bind the federal collector. Federal law governs what is exempt
from federal levy.... [T]here is no room.., for automatic exemption of property that
happens to be exempt from state levy under state law.
Id. at 204-05.
44 United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994).
45 Id. at 227. The disclaimer was made under Minn. Stat. § 501.211 (repealed 1989), "which
permitted the disclaimer of a future interest at any time within six months of the event finally
identifying the disclaimant and causing her interest to become indefeasibly fixed." Irvine, 511 U.S.
at 227.
46 Id. at 226. After an audit of her federal gift tax return, Irvine amended the return to
include additional tax of $7,468,671, and interest exceeding $2 million. Id. at 227-28.
47 Id. at 242. After considering the legislative intent behind enactment of the federal gift tax,
the Court concluded that "Congress had not meant to incorporate state-law fictions as touchstones
of taxability when it enacted the Act. Absent such a legal fiction, the federal gift tax is not struck
blind by a disclaimer." Id. at 240.
48 Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
49 Id. at 53. The Court indicated that "Drye was insolvent and owed the Government
approximately $325,000, representing assessments for deficiencies in years 1988, 1989, and 1990."
Id.
50 Id. Irma Drye's estate was worth approximately $233,000. Id. at 52-53. The disclaimer
created a state-law fiction that Drye had predeceased his mother. Id. at 53. As a result of the
disclaimer, Drye's daughter, Theresa Drye, received the estate with which she created the Drye
Family 1995 Trust. Id.
51 Drye, 528 U.S. at 54-55. Some lower federal courts had adopted a state-theory test to
determine whether a federal tax lien would attach to a disclaimed inheritance. id. at 55 n. 1. Under
this test, if a state held an acceptance-rejection theory of disclaimer, then federal tax liens would not
attach; if a state held a transfer theory of disclaimer, then federal tax liens would attach. Id.
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52
property or rights to property under the federal tax lien statute.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
Don and Sandra Craft were married in 1956." On May 26, 1972,
54
the Crafts purchased a parcel of real property as tenants by the entirety.
Don Craft failed to file federal income tax returns for the years from
1979 through 1986. 55 The Internal Revenue Service assessed a tax
deficiency against Don Craft for $482,446.73 in 1988.56 On March 30,
1989, the Internal Revenue Service filed a notice of federal tax lien

52 Id. at 61. The Court concluded its opinion by noting:
In sum, in determining whether a federal taxpayer's state-law rights constitute property
or rights to property, the important consideration is the breadth of the control- the
taxpayer could exercise over the property. Drye had the unqualified right to receive the
entire value of his mother's estate (less administrative expenses), or to channel that value
to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the
inheritance property or rights to property belonging to him within the meaning of § 6321,
and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
53 Brieffor Respondent at 7, United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002) (No. 00-1831).
54 Craft v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 653 (W.D. Mich. 1999), aff'd by 233 F.3d 358
(6th Cir. 2000), rev'd by 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002). The Crafts purchased the property, located at 2656
Berwyck Road in Grand Rapids, Michigan, for $48,000, and encumbered it with a $37,000
mortgage. Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 1998). The house at that location was
the sole residence of the Crafts. Brief for Respondent at 7, United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414
(2002) (No. 00-1831). Sandra Craft alleged that Don abandoned the home in July 1986. Craft v.
United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1995 WL 549317, at * I (W.D. Mich. July 11, 1995).
55 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1419. Don Craft practiced law during this period,
earning substantial income. Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414
(2002) (No. 00-1831). For an argument that the federal income tax system is unconstitutional see
David Franke, Is Income Tax Legal?.: Evidence Suggests 16th Amendment Never Ratified,
WORLDNETDAILY.COM,

July

9,

1999,

at

http://www.givemeliberty.org/features/taxes/

19990709_xcdfr is_income.htm (suggesting that the Sixteenth Amendment, the constitutional basis
for federal income taxation, was fraudulently ratified).
56 Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 639. The assessment was based upon substitute
income tax returns prepared by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b). Id.
That section of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
(1) Authority of Secretary to execute retum.-If any person fails to make any return
required by any internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder at the time
prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the
Secretary shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as
he can obtain through testimony or otherwise. (2) Status of returns.-Any return so
made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all
legal purposes.
I.R.C. § 6020(b) (2000).
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against all of Don Craft's property and rights 58to property.57 Sandra
Craft's individual tax liabilities were not in issue.
On August 28, 1989, the Crafts conveyed their real property to
Sandra Craft by quitclaim deed for one dollar. 59 A title search
uncovered the tax lien when Sandra Craft subsequently attempted to sell
the property. 60 The Internal Revenue Service eventually agreed to
release the lien, upon the condition that half of the proceeds be held in
escrow, thereby allowing Sandra Craft to sell the property. 6'
B. ProceduralHistory
Sandra Craft filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
62
Western District of Michigan on April 23, 1993, seeking to quiet title

57 Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 639. The notice was filed with the Register of Deeds
in Kent County, Michigan. Id. As far as the IRS is concerned,
assessment is an internal procedure about which no notice need be given to the taxpayer.
This secret lien is valid against the taxpayer and everyone else except "any purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor." In order to
make its tax lien effective against these excepted classes, the IRS must file a notice of
the lien.
ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW 245 (5th ed. 2000) (quoting 26 U.S.C § 6323(a)).
58 Kent L. Jones, Esq., arguing on behalf of the United States, indicated that "I don't know
whether she had any income of her own. I don't know whether she was required to, whether she did
file a return-this case does not involve this-the wife's taxes. It involves the half-million dollars
of taxes of the husband." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *7, United States v.
Craft (2001) (No. 00-1831).
59 Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 639. Don Craft filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code on January 30, 1992. Id. at 639-40. Chapter 7 is "[t]he chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code allowing a trustee to collect and liquidate a debtor's property, either voluntarily or by court
order, to satisfy creditors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (7th ed. 1999).
60 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1419. The discovery of the tax lien prevented the sale
of the property. Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 640. Sandra Craft asked the Internal Revenue
Service to release the lien, but her request was denied. Id.
61 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1419. Sandra Craft sold the property for $119,888.20
in June 1992 to a third party. Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd by
122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002). Sandra Craft received $59,944.10 from the proceeds and the same amount
was placed in a non-interest bearing escrow account. Id. By agreement, the funds held in escrow
remained subject to the federal tax lien to the same extent that the real property had been subject to
the lien. Id. The bankruptcy court entered an order of discharge in Don Craft's Chapter 7 case on
June 1, 1992. Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 640. The bankruptcy court closed the Chapter 7
case on June 11, 1992. Id. Don Craft moved to re-open the bankruptcy case on August 14, 1992,
seeking a determination of whether the federal tax lien attached to the property. Id. The bankruptcy
court re-opened the case, but closed it a second time for lack of jurisdiction because the property at
issue was not part of the bankruptcy estate. 1d.
62 An action to quiet title is "[a] proceeding to establish a plaintiffs title to land by
compelling the adverse claimant to establish a claim or be forever estopped from asserting it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 30 (7th ed. 1999).
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to the proceeds held in escrow. 63 The court granted summary judgment
for the United States, holding that "[a]t the time the joint conveyance
was made, the entireties estate terminated. At that point, each spouse
took an equal half interest in 64the estate and the government's lien
attached to Mr. Craft's interest."
Sandra Craft appealed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment against her.65 The United States filed a cross-appeal on both
of the lower court's decisions of when the lien attached and the value of
Don Craft's interest in the property.66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by decisions in which the U.S. Supreme
Court did not allow state-law legal fictions to prevent attachment.67
63 Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d at 640. The complaint was authorized by 28 U.S.C. §
24 10(a). Id. That section provides that:
[T]he United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court,
or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject matter-(I) to quiet title to...
real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other
lien.
28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (2000).
64 Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 12,
1994), rev'd by 140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998). Sandra Craft argued that the Court should follow
Cole v. Cardoza. Id. at *2. In Cole, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that "the
federal tax lien does not attach to the subject property owned by Eugene and Mary Cole by the
entirety, because the Government's tax lien is against Eugene Cole only." Cole v. Cardoza, 441
F.3d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971). The Internal Revenue Service argued that each spouse owned a
separate interest to which a federal tax lien could attach. Craft v. United States, No. :93-CV-306,
1994 WL 669680, at *2. The Court relied on United States v. Certain Real Property Located at
2525 Leroy Lane, West Bloomfield, Michigan and Fischre v. United States. Id. at 3. In Leroy Lane,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that "the government was precluded from
obtaining the husband's interest in the property unless ... the entireties estate was otherwise
terminated by divorce of joint conveyance in accordance with Michigan law." United States v.
Certain Real Prop. Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d 136, 137 (1992). Fischre was a U.S.
District Court case in which the Western District Court of Michigan concluded that each spouse's
interest "remains inchoate until the entireties estate is terminated by the death of one spouse,
divorce, or joint conveyance. Fischre v. United States, 852 F.Supp 628, 630 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
The Craft court granted Sandra Craft's motions to amend the judgment and to stay execution
because an issue of fact remained as to Don Craft's interest in the property. Craft v. United States,
No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, at **4-5. The court then denied a renewed motion for
summary judgment by the United States based upon Sandra Craft's failure to timely respond to
Requests for Admission. Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1995 WL 549317, at **1-2
(W.D. Mich. July 11, 1995). The court finally determined that Don Craft's interest in the proceeds
of the sale was $50,293.94, which was half of the stipulated fair market value of the property less
the outstanding mortgage balance. Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1995 WL 795088, at
*1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 1995).
65 Craft, 140 F.3d at 639.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 643. The court concluded that the discussed cases "stand for the proposition that
once a property interest exists under state law, state law cannot interfere with attachment of a lien to
that property interest-a matter that is governed by federal law." Id. For a further discussion of this
line of cases, see supra notes 39 through 52 and accompanying text.
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Holding that "Don never held an interest in the Berwyck Property to
which the United States' lien could attach," the Sixth Circuit reversed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United
States. 68 The Sixth Circuit also held that Don Craft did not have a future
interest to which the federal tax lien could attach. 69 Finally, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case because the lower court failed to consider
whether the transfer to Sandra Craft was a fraudulent conveyance.70
On remand, the district court determined that the conveyance of the
7
property by quitclaim deed was not a fraudulent conveyance. '
However, prior to the second trial at the district court, the United States
argued for the first time that the mortgage payments Don Craft had made
while he was insolvent constituted a fraudulent conveyance. 72 The court
agreed and awarded $6,693 to the United States.73
68 Craft, 140 F.3d at 644-45. Criticizing the lower court's decision that the lien attached
during the conveyance, the court noted:
We are unaware of any precedent indicating that an entireties estate is automatically
transformed into a tenancy in common as an intermediary step in the conveyance of the
property. To the contrary, it is clear that at the time the entireties estate terminated,
Sandra was vested with "full and complete title."
Id. at 644 (internal citations omitted).
69 Id.
70 Id. A fraudulent conveyance is defined as "[a] transfer of property for little or no
consideration, made for the purpose of hindering or delaying a creditor by putting the property
beyond the creditor's reach... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (7th ed. 1999).
71 Craft v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 662 (W.D. Mich. 1999), aff'd by 233 F.3d 358
(6th Cir. 2000), rev'd by 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002). The United States had the burden to prove a
fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 656. Under Michigan law, "[e]very conveyance made and every
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to
creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred
without a fair consideration." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566.14 (repealed 1998). Alternatively,
"[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent
as to both present and future creditors." MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 566.17 (repealed 1998). The court
considered numerous cases on point and concluded that "[b]ecause Don's creditors ... could not
attach Don's interest in the Berwyck property to satisfy Don's individual debts, Don's conveyance
of his interest to Sandra could not have constituted a fraud upon his creditors because the property
was beyond their reach." Craft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (citation omitted).
72 Id. at 654. Sandra Craft argued that fraudulent conveyance must be pleaded as a
counterclaim and that the statute of limitations prevented the United States from making a
counterclaim. Id. The court, relying on 26 U.S.C. § 6502 and FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), allowed the
pleading. Id. at 654-55. 26 U.S.C. § 6502 provides in part:
Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been made within the period
of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may be collected by levy or by a
proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun-(I) within 10
years after the assessment of the tax.
I.R.C. § 6502 (2000). FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) provides that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated
a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, ifjustice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation."
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The United States appealed the second district court decision
arguing that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had misapplied the law
in its earlier decision. 74 Sandra Craft argued that this appeal was
precluded by the "law of the case '7 5 doctrine.76 An exception to the
doctrine allows an appeal if the prior decision is "clearly erroneous and
would work a manifest injustice."" The court held that the prior
decision was not clearly erroneous because the decision had support in
precedent within the circuit and78 the U.S. Supreme Court had not
expressly overruled the precedent.
On cross-appeal, Sandra Craft first argued that the lower court
should not have heard the fraudulent enhancement argument.79 She
claimed that the lower court was limited to the issue of whether the
transfer by quitclaim deed was a fraudulent conveyance.80 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the lower court had not exceeded the scope of
remand. 8'
73 Craft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 662. The United States argued that this amount should include
the total mortgage payments made by Don and Sandra Craft while Don was insolvent and the
increase in the value of the property resulting from market forces during the same time period. Id.
at 661. The court found no basis to award funds based solely on the increase in value resulting from
market forces because the increase would have occurred regardless of whether Don Craft made the
mortgage payments. Id. at 661 n.8. The mortgage payments during the period in question totaled
$19,692. Id. at 662. The court deducted the amount of the payments that was attributable to interest
because "such payments do not increase a debtor's equity or constitute a fraud on creditors." Id.
74 Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 2000), rev dby 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002).
75 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 893 (7th ed. 1999). "Law of the case" is "[t]he doctrine
holding that a decision rendered in a former appeal of a case is binding in a later appeal." Id.
76 Craft, 233 F.3d at 361. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the doctrine. Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). See also John G. Stafford, Jr., Understandingthe "Res
Judicata" and "Law of the Case" Doctrines, BRIEFING PAPERS, Sept. 2002 at 1 (2002) (providing
guidelines to assist in understanding the effect of the doctrine); John R. Knight, The Law of the Case
Doctrine: What Does it Really Mean?, FED. LAW., Oct. 1996 at 8 (1996) (noting the inconsistent
application of the doctrine by federal appellate courts).
77 Craft, 233 F.3d at 364.
78 Id. The court relied on Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971) as precedent. The
court acknowledged that reasonable arguments could be made for and against allowing a federal tax
lien to reach property held as tenants by the entirety. Craft, 233 F.3d at 3645. In Cole, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
In Michigan tenants by the entirety hold under a single title. Neither spouse has the
power without concurrence of the other to alienate the estate or any interest therein, and
neither the land nor the rents and profits therefrom are subject to levy or execution for
the sole debts of the husband .... Thus, in the present situation, the federal tax lien does
not attach to the subject property owned by Eugene and Mary Cole by the entirety,
because the Government's tax lien is against Eugene Cole only.
Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971).
79 Craft, 233 F.3d at 369.
80 Id. at 370.
81 Id. In its earlier opinion, the Sixth Circuit indicated that "upon remand, the district court
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Second, Sandra Craft claimed that the fraudulent enhancement
argument was barred by the statute of limitations. 82 The Sixth Circuit
rejected this argument by holding that the lower court had properly
applied the ten-year statute of limitations under 26 U.S.C. § 6502."3
Third, Sandra Craft argued that the United States had no remedy
because Don Craft had passed away.84 She claimed that the Internal
Revenue Service could not reach the escrow funds because they reverted
to her upon Don's death.85 The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument
because the lower court's award was based upon Don's attempt to hide
personal funds to which the tax lien could attach rather than upon his
individual interest in the property.86
Finally, Sandra Craft argued that the Internal Revenue Service
owed her interest on the portion of the escrow funds that was not
awarded to the United States by the lower court. 87 She claimed that 28
U.S.C. § 2411 applied because she was entitled to recover the funds

should consider whether the Berwyck Property was transferred for fraudulent purposes." Craft v.
United States, 140 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1998). This language did "not raise exclusively the
question of whether the August 1989 transfer itself was fraudulent; rather, it permitted the district
court to consider also whether Don and Sandra transferred the property for other fraudulent
purposes as well." Craft, 233 F.3d at 370.
82 Id. at 369.
83 Id. at 372-73. Section 6502 provides:
Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been made within the period
of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may be collected by levy or by a
proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun... within 10
years after the assessment of the tax.
I.R.C. § 6502 (2000).
84 Craft,233 F.3d at 369. Don Craft died in August 1998. Id. at 373.
85 Id. And to further her argument,
She claims that the government stipulated at an early point in the case that its lien
attached to proceeds of the sale of the Berwyck Property to the same extent that the lien
attached to the property itself; once this court found that the tax lien did not attach to the
property, see Craft 1, 140 F.3d at 643-44, the lien attached to nothing and the IRS had
nothing to enforce.
Id. at 373 (footnote omitted).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 369. Federal law provides:
In any judgment of any court rendered (whether against the United States, a collector or
deputy collector of internal revenue, a former collector or deputy collector, or the
personal representative in case of death) for any overpayment in respect of any internalrevenue tax, interest shall be allowed at the overpayment rate established under section
6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 upon the amount of the overpayment, from
the date of the payment or collection thereof to a date preceding the date of the refund
check by not more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
28 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000).
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pursuant to a court judgment. 88 The United States argued that statute did
not apply because the escrow funds were not an overpayment and
because the judgment did not occur in a tax-refund case. 89 The Sixth
Circuit determined that Sandra Craft90 failed to meet the burden of proof
required to prevail on this argument.
The United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the U.S.
Supreme Court granted on September 25, 2001.91 The Court granted
certiorari "to consider the Government's claim that respondent's
husband had a separate interest in the entireties property to which the
federal tax lien attached., 92 The United States did not seek review of the
district court's determination
that the transfer by quitclaim deed was not
93
a fraudulent conveyance.
C. The Majority Opinion

In the U.S. Supreme Court, a six-to-three majority held that Don
Craft's individual interest in the property held as tenants by the entirety94
was property or rights to property under the federal tax lien statute.

Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began the analysis by
88 Craft, 233 F.3d at 374.
89 Id. The Sixth Circuit questioned the strength of this argument:
In Shaw, the Supreme Court simply cited § 2411 as one of several examples of Congress
expressly waiving the government's immunity with respect to interest awards, describing
§ 2411 in a parenthetical as "expressly authorizing prejudgment and postjudgment
interest payable by the United States in tax-refund cases." This parenthetical description
of a statute, contained in a footnote within dicta, is not dispositive of the meaning of §
2411.
Id. at 374 (citations omitted) (quoting Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 n.6 (1986)).
90 Id. at 374-75. The Sixth Circuit implied that Sandra Craft could have prevailed, noting
that "[t]he language of § 2411 is broad." Id. at 374. However, Sandra Craft cited only one district
court case in support of her argument, and that case arguably supported the United States' argument.
Id. at 375.
91 United States v. Craft, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
92 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1420 (2002).
93 Id. at 1426.
We express no view as to the proper valuation of respondent's husband's interest in the
entireties property, leaving this for the Sixth Circuit to determine on remand. We note,
however, that insofar as the amount is dependent upon whether the 1989 conveyance
was fraudulent ... this case is somewhat anomalous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's judgment that this conveyance was not fraudulent, and the Government
has not sought certiorari review of that determination. Since the District Court's
judgment was based on the notion that, because the federal tax lien could not attach to
the property, transferring it could not constitute an attempt to evade the Government
creditor, 65 F.Supp.2d at 657-659, in future cases, the fraudulent conveyance question
will no doubt be answered differently.
Id.
94 Id. at 1425.
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examining the rights Don Craft had in the property under Michigan
law. 95 The Court concluded that Don Craft had:
the right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it,
the right to a share of income produced from it, the right of
survivorship, the right to become a tenant in common with equal
shares upon divorce, the right to sell the property with the respondent's
consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to
place an encumbrance on the property with the respondent's consent,
and the right to block
96 respondent from selling or encumbering the
property unilaterally.
Then the Court considered the federal question of whether these
97
state-law rights qualified as property under the federal tax lien statute.
The Court, apparently in reliance on the line of state-law legal fiction
cases, indicated that "state law labels are irrelevant to the federal
question of which bundle of rights constitute property that may be
attached by a federal tax lien."98 The majority reasoned that the
combination of the right to receive income and the right to exclude
others might be sufficient to qualify as property or rights to property
by Don Craft's
under the statute. 99 The Court was not 0dissuaded
0
property.
the
alienate
unilaterally
inability to
Justice O'Connor expressed concern that a large amount of
property would be exempted from federal tax liens.'0 1 The Court noted
that, if neither spouse was held to own individual interests in entireties
property, the result would lead to abuse of the federal tax system by

95 Id. at 1421-22.
96 Id. at 1422. However, in Long v. Earle, the Supreme Court of Michigan noted that "[i]t is
well settled under the law of this state that one tenant by the entirety has no interest separable from
that of the other .. " Long v. Earle, 269 N.W. 577, 581 (Mich. 1936).
97 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1422. See also Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment
of the Federal Tax Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1166 (2000)
(arguing that the federal question of whether an ability to use or dispose of property subjects the
property to a federal tax lien should not be affected by state characterization of that ability). But see
Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (noting that such analysis is appropriate only when
state laws alter property rights after the fact).
98 Id. at 1420. See supranotes 39 through 52 and accompanying text.
99 Id. at 1423.
100 The Court reasoned that "[lt]here is no reason to believe, however, that this one stick.., is
essential to the category of property." Id.
101 Id. at 1423. Justice O'Connor also noted the "absurd" result that entireties property might
not be available to the Internal Revenue Service to aid in its collection efforts. Id. at 1424.
Presumably Justice O'Connor opposes land-ownership by the federal government for the same
reason. See generally The Endless Range War (May 16, 2001), available at http://www.freemarket.net/spotlight/takings/ (noting that the federal government owns about one-third of the land in
the United States).
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allowing spouses to shield property from collection." °2 Finally, the
Court noted that the legislative history and the common-law background
of the federal tax lien statute are ambiguous 0as3 to whether Congress
intended the statute to reach entireties property.1
D. The Dissenting Opinions
In a brief dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia regretted that the
protection afforded by tenancy by entirety would be limited by the
Court's decision. 0 4 He noted that stay-at-home mothers are much more
likely to take such property by survivorship and are much less likely to
have individual federal tax deficiencies.' 05
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas attacked the
majority's reasoning in its conclusion that a taxpayer could subject
property to federal tax liens merely by possessing a sufficient quantity of
rights to the property. 0 6 Justice Thomas stated, "[t]his amorphous
construct ignores the primacy of state law in defining property interests,
eviscerates the statutory distinction between 'property' and 'rights to
property' drawn by § 6321, and conflicts with an unbroken line of
authority from this Court, the lower courts, and the IRS."' 1 7 The
majority misapplied the line of state-law legal fiction cases, Justice
102 Id. at 1424. But see Libertarian Party 2000 National Campaign Platform (2001),
available at http://www.lp.org/issues/campplat/ (indicating that the collection of federal income
taxes would not be necessary if the federal government limited itself to its constitutional functions).
103 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1425. See also supra note 24.
104 Id. at 1426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion. Id. at 1419. Justice Scalia also pointed to an inconsistency in the majority's reasoning.
I join Justice THOMAS's dissent, which points out (to no relevant response from the
Court) that a State's decision to treat the marital partnership as a separate legal entity,
whose property cannot be encumbered by the debts of its individual members, is no more
novel and no more "artificial" than a State's decision to treat the commercial partnership
as a separate legal entity, whose property cannot be encumbered by the debts of its
individual members.
Id. at 1426. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id. See also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L.
REV. 21 (1994) (considering the implications of the fact that wives generally outlive their
husbands). The recent increase in stay-at-home mothers is largely attributable to the popularity of
homeschooling. See, e.g., Anita Manning, Life in '94 Will Offer Glimpse into Next Century, USA
TODAY, Dec. 22, 1993 at ID (identifying homeschooling as one of the major trends of the 1990's).
106 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1426-27 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justices Stevens and Scalia joined in
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion. Id. at 1419.
107 Id. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960)
(recognizing that state law controls in determining the legal interest in property purportedly subject
to a federal tax lien). See also United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (holding that federal tax
liens attach only to property rights that exist under state law). For a discussion of the "unbroken
line of authority," see supra notes 30 through 38 and accompanying text.
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Thomas reasoned, because the cases concerned only whether state law
could prevent a federal tax108lien from attaching to property after a
property interest was created.
Justice Thomas relied on the line of cases in which federal courts
have concluded that entireties property was beyond the reach of federal
tax liens to conclude that Don Craft did not have property under the tax
lien statute.10 9 Justice Thomas also argued that none of the rights to
property upon which the majority relied were within the reach of the tax
lien statute. 10 Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Internal Revenue
Service has consistently recognized that liens against only one spouse
cannot reach entireties property."'
IV. ANALYSIS
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas alluded to the possibility
that the Court's holding could be extended to allow federal tax liens to
reach property owned by business entities." 12 Justice Thomas noted that
108 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see Johnson, supra note 97, at
1166 (arguing that the federal question of whether any ability to use or dispose of property subjects
the property to a federal tax lien is strictly a federal question).
109 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1431-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I I /d. at 1431-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Thomas cited,
See, e.g., Internal Revenue Manual § 5.8.4.2.3 (RIA 2002), available at WESTLAW,
RIA-IRM database (Mar. 29, 2002) (listing "property owned as tenants by the entirety"
as among the assets beyond the reach of the Government's tax lien); id., § 5.6.1.2.3
(recognizing that a consensual lien may be appropriate "when the federal tax lien does
not attach to the property in question. For example, an assessment exists against only
one spouse and the federal tax lien does not attach to real property held as tenants by the
entirety"); IRS Chief Counsel Advisory (Aug. 17, 2001) (noting that consensual liens, or
mortgages, are to be used "as a means of securing the Government's right to collect from
property the assessment lien does not attach to, such as realproperty held as a tenancy
by the entirety" (emphasis added)); IRS Litigation Bulletin No. 407 (Aug. 1994)
("Traditionally, the government has taken the view that a federal tax lien against a single
debtor-spouse does not attach to property or rights to property held by both spouses as
tenants by the entirety"); IRS Litigation Bulletin No. 388 (Jan. 1993) (explaining that
neither the Department of Justice nor IRS chief counsel interpreted United States v.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983), to mean that a federal
tax lien against one spouse encumbers his or her interest in entireties property, and
noting that it "do[es] not believe the Department will again argue the broader
interpretation of Rodgers," which would extend the reach of the federal tax lien to
property held by the entireties).
Id. at 1432 n.9 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1429 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that, "[t]he Court's
reasoning that because a taxpayer has rights to property a federal tax lien can attach not only to
those rights but also to the property itself could have far-reaching consequences." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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"I see no principled way to distinguish between the propriety of
attaching the federal tax lien to partnership property to satisfy the tax
liability of a partner... and the propriety of attaching the federal tax lien
to tenancy by the entirety property. ..

13 Theoretically, a court could

apply the holding to business entities in situations where an owner
"possesses individual rights.., sufficient to constitute 'property'
or
'rights to property'. ... 14
A. Partnerships
A partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a business for profit."' 15 The Uniform Partnership Act
generally provides the law governing partnerships. 1 6
However,
113 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 1419.
115 UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). One advantage of doing business as a partnership is
the ease of formation. LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 131 (4th ed.
1998).
Forming a general partnership ... requires no filing with the state. A partnership may
arise in two ways. The most common method is consensual formation. It occurs when
two or more individuals enter into a contractual relationship, usually embodied in a
partnership agreement which governs the the [sic] relationship of the partners, including
such matters as managerial rights, distribution' rights, interests in profits and losses, and
rights upon dissolution of the enterprise .... [A] partnership may also arise by operation
of law.
Id. Another advantage of doing business as a partnership is the avoidance of the double taxation of
business income. Id. at 140-43.
A partnership ... is considered an aggregate of individuals rather than a separate entity;
hence, it is not a taxpayer. The partnership files an information return, but the purpose is
essentially to determine how much tax the individual partners will pay on the income or
loss attributable to them from the operation of the partnership. Both the income and
expenses of the partnership are said to "flow-through" to the partners in proportion to
their ownership interests.
Id. at 140.
116 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 22 (2002) (noting that a version of the Uniform
Partnership Act has been adopted with variations by all but one state). See also ALA. CODE §§ 108A-103 to 10-8A-1 109 (2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.05.010 to 32.05.430 (2002); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-301 to 29-1105 (2003); ARK.' CODE ANN. §§ 4-42-101 to 4-42-702 (Michie 2002)
(repealed effective January 1, 2005); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16100-16962 (West 2003); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-60-101 to 7-60-154 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-300 to 34-397
(West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-101 to 15-210 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.81001
to 620.99002 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-8-1 to 14-8-64 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 425101 to 425-145 (2002); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-3-101 to 53-3-1205 (2002); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

205/1 to 205/43 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-1-1 to 23-4-1-52 (West 2002); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 486A.101 to 486A.1302 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-lal05 to 56a-1 101 (2001);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.150 to 362.360 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 281-323 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 9A-101 to 9A-1205 (2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, §§ 1-44 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 449.1 to 449.48
(West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 323A.01-01 to 323A.12-03 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
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partnerships are also regulated by common law and, because partnership
agreements may alter 17the default provisions of the Uniform Partnership
Act, by contract law.'
The Craft court identified first the right to use property as a right
that, when combined with other individual property rights, could allow a
federal tax lien to reach entireties property.' 18 The Uniform Partnership
Act provides the right for partners to use partnership property."19
However, the right is limited to use for partnership
purposes and is
120
subject to the terms of the partnership agreement.
The Craft court then considered the right to exclude third parties
from property. 121 The Uniform Partnership Act does not include the
right to exclude in its provisions relating to the extent and nature of a
partner's property rights. 122 However, in Mississippi Valley Title Ins.
Co. v. Malkove, 123 the Supreme Court of Alabama set forth the
79-12-1 to 79-12-119 (2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 358.010 to 358.510 (West 2002); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to 35-10-710 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-401 to 67-467 (2003); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 87.010 to 87.560 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-A:1 to 304-A:43 (2002); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1A-1 to 42:1A-56, 42:1A-59 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-IA-101 to
54-IA-1206 (Michie 2002); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ I to 74, 121-1500 to 121-1503 (McKinney
2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-31 to 59-73 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-13-01 to 45-21-08
(2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1775.01 to 1775.63 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§
201-43 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 67.005 to 67.810 (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
8301-8365 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-12-12 to 7-12-55 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-4110 to 33-41-1220 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 48-7A-103 to 48-7A-1 101 (Michie
2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-101 to 61-1-147 (2002); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b,
§§ 1.01 to 11.04 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-1 to 48-1-48 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 3201-3313 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.79 to 50-73.149 (Michie 2003); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.05.013 to 25.05.550 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE §§ 47B-1-1 to 47B-1 1-5
(2002); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 178.01 to 178.39 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-101 to 1721-1003 (Michie 2002).
117 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 22 (2002).
118 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct.at 1422.
119 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a) (1914). See also Putnam v. Shoaf, 620 S.W.2d 510 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a partner's individual rights to partnership property includes the right
of equal use and possession for partnership purposes); Mfrs. Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 235 N.W.2d 825
(Minn. 1975) (holding that each partner in a partnership which owned an office building had a right
to use the building as a depository). Cf Darden v. Cox, 137 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1962)
(holding that a partner may not use partnership property for private use without compensating the
other partners).
120 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a) (1914). The Act provides that "[a] partner, subject to the
provisions of this act and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his
partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
25(2)(a) (1914) (emphasis added). However, partners may consent to a partner's use of partnership
property for non-partnership purposes. UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 25(2)(a) (1914).
121 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1422.
122 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 24-25 (1914).
123 Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Malkove, 540 So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1988). In Mississippi
Valley Title Insurance Co., Bernard and Melvin Malkove purchased title insurance on real property
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partnership's right to exclude others from using partnership property. 24
The court noted that the right to exclude belonged to the partnership
entity rather than to the partners individually. 125 Therefore, partners
have the right to exclude third parties from
partnership property only
26
1
partnership.
the
of
behalf
on
while acting
Next, the Craft court identified the individual right to a share of
income produced from property.1 27 The Uniform Partnership Act
requires partners to share the income produced from partnership
property along with a corresponding duty to share equally in partnership
losses. 128 In fact, "receipt by a person of a share of the profits of' 29a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business."'
Additionally, when a partnership is terminated, partners30 share any profits
remaining after the payment of partnership liabilities.'
Then the Craft court identified the right of survivorship. 13 1 Under
the Uniform Partnership Act, the death of a partner results in the
dissolution of the partnership. 32 The Uniform Partnership Act defines
dissolution of a partnership as "the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on [of

owned individually. Id. at 680. The issue was whether the title insurance policy remained effective
when the Malkove brothers subsequently conveyed the property to a partnership. Id. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision permitting the Malkoves to collect proceeds
from the policy. Id. at 678.
124 /d.at681.
125 Id.
126 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914) (giving all partners "equal rights in the management
and conduct of the partnership business"); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 24 (1914) (identifying the right to
participate in management as a property right of each partner).
127 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
128 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 18(a) (1914).
Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to
the partnership property and share equally in the profits and surplus remaining after all
liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the
losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his
share in the profits.
UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 18(a) (1914). See also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 26 (1914) (indicating that "[a]
partner's interest in the partnership is his share of profits and surplus").
129 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 7(1914).
130 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 40 (1914).
The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as follows: I. Those
owing to creditors other than partners, II. Those owing to partners other than for capital
and profits, Ill. Those owing to partners in respect of capital, IV. Those owing to
partners in respect of profits.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 40(b) (1914).

131 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
132 UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 31 (1914).
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partnership business].' 3 3
When dissolution occurs, the remaining partners must choose
whether to continue carrying on the business by forming a new
partnership or to wind up the business. 134 If they choose to wind up the
old partnership, the partnership property is used to pay partnership
liabilities and any remainder is distributed to the partners as profits. 135 If
they choose to carry on the business in a new partnership, the estate of
the deceased partner is entitled to the value of his interest in the
partnership plus interest or a 36share of the profits generated by the assets
of the dissolved partnership.1
Therefore, the method by which a partnership may succeed to a
deceased partner's rights to partnership property is the functional
equivalent to the right of survivorship. Additionally, the applicable
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act are default provisions;
partners could specifically agree to give each other rights of survivorship
in their partnership agreement. 137 Furthermore, some states explicitly
provide the right of survivorship to partnerships by statute.' 3 8
133

UNIF. P'SHIP ACT

§ 29(1914).

134 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 37 (1914) (providing that "[u]nless otherwise agreed the partners
who have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership or the legal representative of the last surviving
partner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs"); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 41-42
(1914) (containing provisions regarding the continuation of partnership business after dissolution).
135 See UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 40 (1914) (setting forth the rules for distribution of partnership
assets upon distribution).
136 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 42 (1914).
When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued.., without any
settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership
continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed , he or his legal representative as
against such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of
dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the
value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the
option of his legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of
his right in the property of the dissolved partnership....
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 42 (1914).
137 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 37, 42 (1914). Section 37 provides that "Unless otherwise agreed
the partners who have... " UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 37 (1914) (emphasis added). Section 42 provides
that "the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed... " UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 42 (1914) (emphasis added).
138 E.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2000).
[E]states held in joint tenancy for the purpose of carrying on and promoting trade and
commerce, or any useful work or manufacture, established and pursued with a view of
profit to the parties therein concerned, are vested in the surviving partner, in order to
enable him to settle and adjust the partnership business, or pay off the debts which may
have been contracted in pursuit of the joint business; but as soon as the same is effected,
the survivor shall account with, and pay, and deliver to the heirs, executors and
administrators respectively of such deceased partner all such part, share, and sums of
money as he may be entitled to by virtue of the original agreement, if any, or according
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Then the Craft court identified the right to become a tenant in
common with equal shares upon divorce.1 39 Divorce, like death, has the
effect of terminating a marriage. 140 Therefore, a court would analyze
again the effects of partnership dissolution to identify a similar property
right in the partnership context. 141
A court also might consider the effects of partnership dissolution
when the dissolution occurs in contravention of the partnership
agreement. 42 Section 38 of the Uniform Partnership Act contains the
rights of partners involved in a wrongful dissolution. 143 The rights of the
remaining partners are essentially the same as if the dissolution were
permitted except that the remaining partners are also entitled to damages
144
from the partner who wrongfully caused the dissolution.
Then the Craft court identified the right to sell the property with the
other spouse's consent and to receive a share of the proceeds from such
a sale. 45 A partner's right to unilaterally sell property varies depending
upon whether the transaction falls within the ordinary course of
partnership business. 146 If the transaction falls within the ordinary
course of business, a partner's act binds the partnership unless the third
party knows that the partner does not have authority to complete the
transaction. 147 If the transaction does not fall within the ordinary course
to his share or part in the joint concern, in the same manner as partnership stock is
usually settled between joint merchants and the representatives of their deceased
partners.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2000).
139 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
140 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (7th ed. 1999). Divorce is the "legal dissolution of a
marriage by a court." Id.
141 See supra notes 132 through 138 and accompanying text.
142 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1914) (indicating that "[d]issolution is caused... [in
contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not permit a
dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner at any
time"). Dissolution is permitted when the partnership terminates under the terms of the partnership
agreement, when any partner expressly wills termination absent terms in the partnership agreement,
when all partners expressly agree to the termination, when a partner is appropriately expelled from
the partnership, when it becomes unlawful to carry on the partnership business, when a partner dies
or becomes bankrupt, or when a court decrees dissolution of the partnership. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31
(1914).
143 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38 (1914).
144 Compare UNIF. P'SH1P ACT § 38 (1914), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 37, 42 (1914).
145 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
146 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997).
147 UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 301 (1997).
An act of a partner, including the execution of an instrument in the partnership name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the partnership business or business of
the kind carried on by the partnership binds the partnership, unless the partner had no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter and the person with whom the
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of business, a partner's act binds the partnership only if the partner148has
actual authority from the other partners to complete the transaction.
Additionally, a partner's right to sell partnership property may be
spelled out in a statement of partnership authority. 49 A third party
without knowledge to the contrary generally can rely upon such a
statement when transacting with a partner, unless the transaction
involves real property.' 50 If the transaction involves the transfer of title
to real property, a third party generally can rely upon a statement of
authority unless a subsequent statement limiting the original
partnership
15 1
file.
is on
Thus, in many circumstances, a partner will have the authority, by
agreement or by statute, to unilaterally sell partnership property.' 52
When this occurs, the partner is entitled to a proportionate share of the
profits or losses resulting from the sale of property. 153 Therefore,
partners will frequently have rights equivalent to those of tenants by the
partner was dealing knew or had received a notification that the partner lacked authority.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997).
148 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997). "An act of a partner which is not apparently for carrying
on in the ordinary course the partnership business or business of the kind carried on by the
partnership binds the partnership only if the act was authorized by the other partners." UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 301 (1997).
149 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (1997) (noting that "[a] partnership may file a statement of
authority, which... may state the authority, or limitations on the authority, of some or all of the
partners to enter into other transactions on behalf of the partnership and any other matter").
150 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 303(d)(1)(1997).
Except for transfers of real property, a grant of authority contained in a filed statement of
partnership authority is conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without
knowledge to the contrary, so long as and to the extent that a limitation on that authority
is not then contained in another filed statement. A filed cancellation of a limitation on
authority revives the previous grant of authority.
UN1F. P'SHIP ACT § 303(d)(1) (1997).
151 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (1997).
A grant of authority to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership
contained in a certified copy of a filed statement of partnership authority recorded in the
office for recording transfers of that real property is conclusive in favor of a person who
gives value without knowledge to the contrary, so long as and to the extent that a
certified copy of a filed statement containing a limitation on that authority is not then of
record in the office for recording transfers of that real property.... A person not a
partner is deemed to know of a limitation on the authority of a partner to transfer real
property held in the name of the partnership if a certified copy of the filed statement
containing the limitation on authority is of record in the office for recording transfers of
that real property.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (1997).
152 See supranotes 145 through 151 and accompanying text.
153 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(b) (1997) (providing that "[e]ach partner is entitled to an equal
share of the partnership profits and is chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in proportion
to the partner's share of the profits").
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entirety to sell property and share in the proceeds.
The Craft court identified next the ability of a tenant by the entirety
to place an encumbrance on the property with the other tenant's
consent.154 A court attempting to determine whether a partner had an
equivalent right to encumber property on behalf of a partnership would
analyze the partner's
authority to enter into such transactions as
55
discussed above.
A partner also has the ability to assign his individual property
rights. 156 "The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific
partnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership, and (3) his right
to participate in management.'1 57 However, "[a] partner's right in
specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with
58
the assignment of rights of all the partners in the same property."'
Additionally, an assignee of a partner's interest cannot participate in the
management of the partnership.159 Thus, in effect, an assignment
conveys only the partner's interest to share in profits. 60 Therefore,
partners have a limited ability to encumber their personal rights to
partnership property and will frequently have the ability to encumber the
property on behalf of the partnership. 16'
Finally, the Craft court identified the right of tenants by the entirety
to block their co-tenants from unilaterally selling or encumbering the
property. 162 A partner can prevent another partner from selling or
encumbering partnership property in the ordinary course of business by
notifying the other party to the transaction that the partner is not
154 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
155 See supranotes 145 through 152 and accompanying text.
156 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 27 (1914).
157

UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 24 (1914).

158 UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 25(2) (b) (1914).
159 UNIF. P'SfiP ACT § 27(1) (1914). The Act explains,
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the
partnership, nor, as against the other partners in the absence of an agreement, entitle the
assignee, during the continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or
administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or
account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books. ...
Id.
160 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 27(1) (1914). The Act explains,
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership ... merely entitles the
assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning
partner would otherwise be entitled .... In case of a dissolution of the partnership, the
assignee is entitled to receive his assignor's interest and may require an account from the
date only of the last account agreed to by all the partners.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 27 (1914).
161 See supra notes 155 through 160 and accompanying text.
162 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
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authorized to bind the partnership. 163 A partner can prevent another
partner from selling or encumbering partnership property in transactions
outside the ordinary course of business
simply by failing to authorize the
1 64
other partner to bind the partnership.'
In addition to the "ordinary course of business" provision, partners
can demonstrate their authority to bind partnerships with statements of
partnership authority.1 65 If a partnership has only two partners, either
partner can prevent the other from selling or encumbering partnership
property in this way by refusing to sign the statement of partnership
authority.166 Also, a partner can counter an executed and filed statement
of partnership authority by filing a statement of denial. 167 Thus, partners
generally have the ability to block other partners from unilaterally
168
selling or encumbering partnership property.
In Craft, the U.S. Supreme Court held that tenants by the entirety
have sufficient individual rights to property to cause the property to fall
within the reach of federal tax liens. 169 In many circumstances, partners
possess the same individual rights to partnership property that the Court
identified with tenants by the entirety, suggesting the possibility that the
Internal Revenue Service could attempt to place liens on partnership
163 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 301 (1997).
An act of a partner, including the execution of an instrument in the partnership name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the partnership business or business of the
kind carried on by the partnership binds the partnership, unless the partner had no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter and the person with whom the
partner is dealing knew or had received a notification that thepartnerlacked authority.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997) (emphasis added). But see UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 4010) (1997)
(indicating that a majority of the partners must agree to withhold authority when the transaction is
within the ordinary course of business).
164 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997). "An act of a partner which is not apparently for carrying
on in the ordinary course the partnership business or business of the kind carried on by the
partnership binds the partnership only if the act was authorized by the other partners." Id.
(emphasis added). See also UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 301 (1997) (indicating that "[a]n act outside the
ordinary course of business of a partnership .. may be undertaken only with the consent of all of
the partners").
165 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (1997).
166 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 105(c) (1997) (requiring the signatures of at least two partners for
any statement filed on behalf of a partnership).
167 See UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 304 (1997).
A partner or other person named as a partner in a filed statement of partnership authority
or in a list maintained by an agent pursuant to Section 303(b) may file a statement of
denial stating the name of the partnership and the fact that is being denied, which may
include denial of a person's authority or status as a partner. A statement of denial is a
limitation on authority as provided in Section 303(d) and (e).
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 304 (1997).
168 See supra notes 163 through 167 and accompanying text.
169 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1425 (2002).
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property to collect tax debts owed by partners individually. 170 Justice
O'Connor attempts to allay such fears by noting that federal tax liens, in
accordance with state law, attach only to a partnership's interest in the
partnership.' 7'
Later in the opinion, however, Justice O'Connor
proclaims that the federal
collector is not bound by state laws applying
1 72
to state-law creditors.
B. Limited Partnerships
A limited partnership is "a partnership formed by two or more
persons.., and having one or more general partners and one or more
limited partners."' 7 3 All fifty states have enacted statutes providing for

170 See supra notes 118 through 168 and accompanying text.
171 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1424. "As a holder of this lien, the Federal Government is entitled to
'receive ...the profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled,' including
predissolution distributions and the proceeds from dissolution." Id. (quoting section 27 of the
Uniform Partnership Act of 1914). See also 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 22 (2002) (noting that
a version of the Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted with variations by all but one state).
172 Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1425-26. Justice O'Conner explains,
We therefore conclude that respondent's husband's interest in the entireties property
constituted "property" or "rights to property" for the purposes of the federal tax lien
statute. We recognize that Michigan makes a different choice with respect to state law
creditors: "[L]and held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not subject to levy
under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or wife alone." Sanford v.
Bertrau, 204 Mich. 244, 247, 169 N.W. 880, 881 (1918). But that by no means dictates
our choice. The interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6321 is a federal question, and in
answering that question we are in no way bound by state courts' answers to similar
questions involving state law. As we elsewhere have held, " 'exempt status under state
law does not bind the federal collector."' Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. at 59, 120 S.Ct.
474. See also Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2132 (clarifying that the Supremacy
Clause "provides the underpinning for the Federal Govemment's right to sweep aside
state-created exemptions").
Id.
173 REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 101(7) (amended 1985). A general partner is "a
person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a general partner in accordance with the
partnership agreement and named in the certificate of limited partnership as a general partner."
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHiP ACT § 101(5) (amended 1985). A limited partner is "a person who has
been admitted to a limited partnership as a limited partner in accordance with the partnership
agreement." REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (amended 1985). Limited liability is an
advantage to doing business as a limited partnership. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 115 at 130.
In a limited partnership, a limited partner has no voice in the active management of the
partnership, which is conducted by the general partner ....Additionally, the limited
partner's liability is limited to her initial contribution to the partnership, while the
general partner is subject to unlimited liability.
Id. Another advantage is the increased ability of the entity to raise capital. "Because of the limited
liability protections afforded to limited partners and the tax advantages ... the limited partnership is
an easier vehicle for raising capital than is the general partnership. Accordingly, it is often the form
used in large enterprises organized as partnerships." Id. at 136.
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limited partnerships. 174 The Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act generally provide the law
75
governing limited partnerships.1
Both of the uniform acts contain provisions indicating that general
partners in limited partnerships generally have the same rights and
powers as partners in partnerships without limited partners.' 76 For this
reason, courts likely would conclude that general partners in limited
partnerships have the same rights to partnership
property as partners in
77
partnerships without limited partners.'
Because limited partners do not actively participate in management,
they have few of the property rights possessed by tenants by the
entirety. 17 For example, neither uniform act provides limited partners
with the right to use partnership property, the right to exclude third
parties from partnership property, the right to sell partnership property,
or the right to prevent other partners from selling or encumbering
partnership property. 179 However, limited partners do have the right to
share in the proceeds from the sale of property, 180 the right to receive
174 59A AM. JUR. 20 Partnership§ 1233 (2002)
175 See 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 1233 (2002) (indicating that Alaska, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont have enacted the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act with some variations, and that Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have enacted the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act with some
variations).
176 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 403 (amended 1985); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 9
(1916).
Except as provided in this Act or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a
limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner
in a partnership without limited partners ... has the liabilities of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners to persons other than the partnership and the other
partners ... [and] has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners
to the partnership and to the other partners.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 403 (amended 1985).
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners, except
that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited
partners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no authority to ....
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §9 (1916).
177 See supra notes 118 through 168 and accompanying text.
178 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 305 (amended 1985) (enumerating the rights of
limited partners); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 10 (1916) (specifying the rights of limited partners).
179 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 305 (amended 1985) (specifying the rights of
limited partners); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 10 (1916) (enumerating the rights of limited partners).
180 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 503 (amended 1985) (providing that "[t]he profits
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their share of partnership property at termination, 181 and the right to
82
encumber their interest in the partnership property. 1

Because limited partners possess few individual rights to
partnership property, a court might be unlikely to apply the Craft
holding to limited partners. 8 3 However, the Craft court reasoned that
the combination of the right to receive income and the right to exclude
184
others might be sufficient to qualify as property or rights to property.
Therefore, a court could combine a limited partner's right to receive
income, a right to exclude others from partnership property found in
either a partnership agreement or the common law, and the Court's
reasoning to conclude that the Internal Revenue Service could place a
lien on the assets of a limited partnership
to collect delinquent taxes
85
owed by a limited partner individually.'
C. Limited Liability Companies
A limited liability company "is an unincorporated business
organization that combines certain features of the corporate form with
others more closely resembling general partnerships."' 86 Many states
and losses of a limited partnership shall be allocated among the partners, and among classes of
partners, in the manner provided in writing in the partnership agreement"); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §
10(2) (1916) (providing that limited partners "shall have the right to receive a share of the profits or
other compensation by way of income").
A limited partner may receive from the partnership the share of the profits or the
compensation by way of income stipulated for in the certificate; provided, that after such
payment is made, whether from the property of the partnership or that of a general
partner, the partnership assets are in excess of all liabilities of the partnership except
liabilities to limited partners on account of their contributions and to general partners.
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 15 (1916).
181 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHiP ACT § 804 (amended 1985) (indicating that during
winding up partnership assets should be distributed to partners after paying creditors and other
liabilities); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 10 (1916) (indicating that limited partners have priority over
general partners in the settling of accounts).
182 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §§ 701-05 (amended 1985) (governing the
assignment of partnership interests); UNIF. LTD. P'SHiP ACT § 19 (1916) (noting that a limited
partner's interest is assignable).
183 See supra notes 178 through 182 and accompanying text.
184 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1423 (2002).
185 See id.
186 WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
329 (2001).
It [the limited liability company] allows somewhat more flexibility than the
corporation... in developing rules for management and control .... The LLC also
offers advantageous tax treatment as compared with a corporation. A corporation pays
tax on its profits as earned and the shareholders (the equity investors) pay a second tax
when those profits are distributed to them. Investors in an LLC are taxed, like partners,
only once on its profits, as those profits are earned. Moreover, the investors in an LLC

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol18/iss1/3

28

Fisher: The Internal Revenue Service Collects from an Innocent Spouse in

UNITED STATES v. CRAFT

2003]

have enacted statutes providing for the limited liability company
business entity.'87 Limited liability companies can be managed by their
investors, called members, or by managers who need not be members. 188
Generally, members of manager-managed limited liability
companies do not possess substantial rights to company property
because they are not actively involved in management.189 Likewise, the
managers of such companies do not possess rights to company property
because they are merely agents. 90 However, members of member91
managed companies have substantial rights to company property.'
A court determining whether to extend the Craft holding to
member-managers would first consider the member-managers' rights to
use and exclude others from company property. 192 ., Each membermanager has an equal right to participate in the company's
management. 193 Managing the business would likely involve using and
dealing with company property. 194 Additionally, managing the business
might entail taking legal action to exclude others from company
95
property. 1
Next a court would consider the member-manager's right to receive
a share of the income produced by company property.' 96 Members may
establish their own distribution arrangements in an operating
agreement. 197 If a company chooses to make distributions prior to
can take account, on their individual tax returns, of any losses of the LLC as those losses
are incurred; the losses are said to "pass through." A corporation's losses can be carried
forward to offset any future profits but cannot be used by its shareholders. In addition,
the LLC allows greater freedom than a corporation in allocating profit and loss for tax
purposes.
Id.
187 David M. Hastings, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability
Company Acts, 79 A.L.R. 5th 689 (2000).
188 KLEIN ET AL., supranote 186 at 329.
189 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404 cmt. (1996).
190 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(b) (1996).
191 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(c) (1996) (noting that member-managers
generally may bind the company in transactions involving real property).
192 See United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
193 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404(a)(1) (1996).
194 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 112(b)(2) (1996) (authorizing limited liability companies
to "purchase, receive, lease... and otherwise deal with real or personal property, or any legal or
equitable interest in property, wherever located").
195 See UNIF. LTD. LtAB. Co. ACT § 112(b)(l) (1996) (including the power to bring suit
among the powers provided for limited liability companies).
196 See Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1422.
197 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103 (1996) (pertaining to operating agreements).
[A]II members of a limited liability company may enter into an operating agreement,
which need not be in writing, to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of
its business, and to govern relations among the members, managers, and company. To

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

29

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 18 [2003], Art. 3

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol 18

dissolution, however, the distributions must be made in equal shares. 198
Then a court would examine the member-manager's right to receive
property upon dissolution of the company and upon the member's
dissociation.' 99 Members are entitled to share in any surplus remaining
upon the winding up of business following dissolution. 200 1This is true
20
even when a member's dissociation causes the dissolution.
Upon the dissociation of a member, the remaining members must
choose to dissolve the company and wind up business or to purchase the
dissociated member's distributional interest.20 2 Unless the articles of
organization specify a term of existence for the company, the company
must purchase the dissociated member's distributional interest. 0 3 A
company must, make a final distribution even to members who
wrongfully dissociate; however, the company may offset an amount
equivalent to damages it has sustained. 20 4 Therefore, a member-manager
is entitled to receive a share of company property when his relationship
20 5
with the company ends regardless of the circumstances.
A court would then consider the member-manager's right to sell
company property with the consent of the other members and to receive
a share of the proceeds from such a sale. 20 6 Member-managers generally
the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs
relations among the members, managers, and company.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(a) (1996). See also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(b) (1995)
(discussing limitations upon the effect of operating agreements).
198 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 405(a) (1996).
199 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
200 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 806 (1996).
In winding up a limited liability company's business, the assets of the company must be
applied to discharge its obligations to creditors, including members who are creditors.
Any surplus must be applied to pay in money the net amount distributable to members in
accordance with their right to distributions .... Each member is entitled to a distribution
upon the winding up of the limited liability company's business consisting of a return of
all contributions which have not previously been returned and a distribution of any
remainder in equal shares.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 806 (1996).
201 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603 (1996). "The term 'dissociation' refers to the change in
relationships among the dissociated member, the company and the other members caused by a
member's ceasing to be associated in the carrying on ofthe company's business." UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
Co. ACT § 601 cmt. (1995). See also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601 (1995) (enumerating the
events which will cause a member's dissociation).
202 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603(a) (1996). See also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701
(1995) (containing default rules for a limited liability company's purchase of a distributional
interest).
203 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 603(a) (1996).
204 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 602 (1996).
205 See supra notes 199 through 204 and accompanying text.
206 See United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
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have the right to bind companies in transactions entered into in the
ordinary course of business. 20 7 This is true even in transactions
involving real property, unless the members' authority is explicitly
limited in the articles of organization. 2 08 Member-managers can bind
companies in transactions not within the ordinary course of business
with the consent of the other members. 20 9 Members
share in the profit
210
resulting from such transactions as discussed above.
A court would consider next the member-manager's right to
encumber company property with the other members' consent. 211
Limited liability companies are generally authorized by statute to
encumber their property.212 A member-manager generally has the
authority to complete such a transaction on behalf of the company if the
transaction falls within the ordinary course of business. 21 3 A membermanager can bind the company outside the ordinary course of business
with the consent of the other members.21 4
Although members have no transferable interest in company

207 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a) (1996).
Each member is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business,
and an act of a member, including the signing of an instrument in the company's name,
for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business or business of
the kind carried on by the company binds the company, unless the member had no
authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the person with whom the
member was dealing knew or had notice that the member lacked authority.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (1996).
208 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 301(c) (1996).
Unless the articles of organization limit their authority, any member of a membermanaged company or manager of a manager-managed company may sign and deliver
any instrument transferring or affecting the company's interest in real property. The
instrument is conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the
lack of authority of the person signing and delivering the instrument.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 30 1(c) (1996).
209 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 30 1(a) (1996). "An act of a member which is not apparently
for carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business or business of the kind carried on by
the company binds the company only if the act was authorized by the other members." UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. CO. ACT§ 301(a) (1996).
210 See supra notes 196 through 205 and accompanying text.
211 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
212 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 112(b)(5) (1996). Limited liability companies have the
power to:
Make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow money, issue its notes, bonds,
and other obligations, which may be convertible into or include the option to purchase
other securities of the limited liability company, and secure any of its obligations by a
mortgage on or a security interest in any of its property, franchises, or income.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § I12(b)(5) (1996).
213 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co ACT § 301(a) (1996).
214

UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
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property,21 5 members do have the right to transfer their distributional
interests in the company.21 6 A transferee generally takes no rights other
than the right to receive distributions. 2 17 However, the transferee may
become a member if so stated in the operating agreement and the other
members consent. 218 Consequently, member-managers generally have
the right to encumber company property, on behalf of the company, and
21 9
have a limited right to do so individually.
Lastly, a court would consider a member-manager's right to prevent
other members from unilaterally selling or encumbering company
property.220 Selling and encumbering property22 does not require the
unanimous consent of the company's members. 2 ' For this reason, a
member-manager would need the support of a majority of the members
to challenge such a transaction. 222 The majority could block a
transaction outside the ordinary course of business simply by
withholding their authority.2 23 If the transaction was within the ordinary
course of business, the majority also would need to provide notice to the
third party.22 4
Blocking a transaction that involves the selling or encumbering of
real property is more problematic. 225 Member-managers are authorized
to enter such transactions unless the articles of organization limit their
authority to do So. 2 26 If the authority is limited, an objecting member
215 UNIF. LTD. LIAR. CO. ACT § 501(a) (1996).
216 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 501(b) (1996).
217 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502 (1996). "A transfer of a distributional right does not
entitle the transferee to become or to exercise any rights of a member. A transfer entitles the
transferee to receive, to the extent transferred, only the distributions to which the transferor would
be entitled." UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502 (1996).
218 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT§ 503(a) (1996).
219 See supra notes 211 through 218 and accompanying text.
220 See United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
221 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 404(c) (1996). However, unanimous consent is required
if the transaction would result in the violation of a duty of loyalty or would involve substantially all
of the company's property. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 404(c)(2), 404(c)(12) (1996).
222 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 404(a)(2) (1996) (indicating that any business matter not
requiring unanimous consent may be decided by a majority of the company's members).
223 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a)(2) (1996) (requiring a transaction outside the ordinary
course of business to be authorized by the other members).
224 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a)(l) (1996) (noting that the company is bound in such
transactions "unless the member had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and
the person with whom the member was dealing knew or had notice that the member lacked
authority").
225 See generally UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(c) (1996) (discussing members' authority
to bind companies in transactions involving real property).
226 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(c) (1996).
Unless the articles of organization limit their authority, any member of a membermanaged company or manager of a manager-managed company may sign and deliver
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can prevent the transaction simply by providing notice to the third
party.227 If the authority is not limited, the objecting member can
prevent the transaction only by amending the articles of organization.228
Amending the articles of organization requires unanimous consent of the
members, however, and the party attempting to complete
the transaction
229
presumably would not consent to the amendment.
In Craft, the U.S. Supreme Court held that tenants by the entirety
have sufficient individual rights to property for federal tax liens against
just one tenant to reach the property. 230 Because member-managers of
limited liability companies have essentially the same rights to company
property that tenants have to entireties property, the Internal Revenue
Service could, in reliance on Craft, place liens upon company property
to collect delinquent taxes owed individually by a member-manager. 23'
D. Closely Held Corporations
Corporations are collective business entities created under state
law. 232 The Model Business Corporation Act is the basis for corporation
law in the majority of states. 33
Shareholders, the owners of
corporations, generally do not manage the corporation's business.234 A
board of directors maintains responsibility for management of the
corporation, which is carried out by the officers.2 35 Closely held
any instrument transferring or affecting the company's interest in real property. The
instrument is conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the
lack of authority of the person signing and delivering the instrument.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(c) (1996).
227 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(c) (1996).
228 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(c) (1996). See also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §
204 (1996) (detailing the requirements and procedure for amending the articles of organization).
229 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404(c)(3) (1995).
230 United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1426 (2002).
231 See supra notes 192 through 229 and accompanying text.
232 SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 115 at 130-3 1. The four basic attributes of corporations are
centralized management, limited liability, transferability of ownership interests, and the fact that the
corporation is a separate entity with perpetual existence. id. at 1. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§§ 2.01 to 2.07 (1984) (providing a sample of statutory requirements for incorporation).
233 SOLOMON ET AL., supranote 115 at 35 (noting that thirty-five states have enacted statutes
based upon the current or previous versions of the Model Business Corporation Act).
234 Id. at 35.
235 Id. at 35-36. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1991) (setting forth requirements
and duties for directors).
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement
authorized under section 7.32.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1991).
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corporations generally have few shareholders, but the shareholders are
actively involved in management.2 36 Frequently, in closely held
corporations majority shareholders will serve also as directors and as
officers.2 37
A court determining whether to extend the Craft holding to such
shareholders in closely held corporations would first consider the
shareholders' rights to use and exclude others from the corporations'
property. 238 The corporate bylaws specify the duties and authority of
corporate officers. 239 If the bylaws provided the rights at issue, the
shareholder would have the rights simply by serving as an officer.2 40 If
the bylaws did not provide the rights, the shareholder could amend the
bylaws to do so. 24 1
Then the court would consider the shareholder's right to share in
the income produced by corporate property. 242 Subject to limitations,
"[a] board of directors may authorize, and the corporation may make
distributions to its shareholders.
,243 Acting as the director, therefore,
the shareholder could authorize distribution of the income.24 4
The court would next consider the shareholder's right to a share of
the corporate property when the corporation dissolves.245 Shareholders
may approve the voluntary dissolution of a corporation. 246 Involuntary
236 SOLOMON ET AL., sipra note 115 at 419-20. However, "there is no generally agreed-upon
definition of a 'close corporation."' Id. at 419. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984)
(permitting shareholders to agree to less formal corporate structures including the elimination of the
board of directors).
237 SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 115 at 36.
238 See United States v. Craft, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 1422 (2002).
239 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.41 (1991). See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.06 (1991).
240 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.41 (1991). See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.06 (199 1).
241 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a) (1984).
The power to amend or repeal bylaws is shared by the board of directors and the
shareholders, unless that power is reserved exclusively to the shareholders by an
appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation. Section 10.20(b)(l) provides that
the power to amend or repeal the bylaws may be reserved to the shareholders "in whole
or in part."
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20 cmt. (1984).
242 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
243 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1991). See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c)
(1991) (restricting distributions in limited circumstances).
244

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1991).

245 See Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1422.
246 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (1991).
For a proposal to dissolve to be adopted: (1)the board of directors must recommend
dissolution to the shareholders unless the board of directors determines that because of
conflict of interest or other special circumstances it should make no recommendation and
communicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders; and (2) the
shareholders entitled to vote must approve the proposal to dissolve....
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dissolution can result from proceedings initiated by the secretary of state
or attorney general.247 Shareholders share any corporate property
remaining after the corporation has paid its creditors regardless of
248
whether the dissolution was voluntary.
The court would then consider the right to sell corporate property
and to share in the proceeds of the sale. 249 Directors and officers
generally may sell corporate property in the ordinary course of business
Moreover, a majority
without first seeking shareholder approval.
shareholder could authorize the sale in those circumstances in which
shareholder consent is required. 251 The shareholder would share in the
proceeds just as he would share in the income produced by the
property. 252
The court would then consider the majority shareholder's right to
place an encumbrance on the property with the other shareholders'
consent.253 Directors and officers have broad authority to encumber
property.254 Unless their authority is restricted in the articles of
incorporation, directors and officers may "encumber any or all of its [the
corporation's] property, whether or not in the usual and regular course of
business. 255 If the authority is restricted, a majority shareholder could
to amend the articles to allow for the
cause the corporation
2 56
encumbrance.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.02(b) (1991).
247 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.20 (1991) (setting forth the grounds for administrative
dissolution); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (1991) (setting forth the grounds for judicial
dissolution).
248 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.05 (1991) (identifying the procedures for winding up
and liquidating business at dissolution); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.21(c) (1991) (indicating that
section 14.05 is applicable in administrative dissolutions); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.33 (1991)
(authorizing courts to direct the winding up and liquidation pursuant to section 14.05).
249 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
250 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (1991).
251 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02 (1991) (discussing dispositions that require
shareholder approval).
252 See supra notes 242 through 244 and accompanying text.
253 See Craft, 122 S.Ct. at 1422.
254 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (1991).
255 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (1991).
256 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1991) (setting forth the manner for amending
articles of incorporation).
A corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time to add or change a
provision that is required or permitted in the articles of incorporation or to delete a
provision that is not required in the articles of incorporation. Whether a provision is
required or permitted in the articles is determined as of the effective date of the
amendment.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.01(a) (1991).
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Finally, the court would consider the shareholder's right to block
other shareholders from selling or encumbering corporate property
unilaterally. 257 The board of directors is responsible for the exercise of
corporate power and management of a corporation's business and
affairs. 258
A majority shareholder could thus prevent a sale or
encumbrance of corporate property by electing only directors who would
not to consent to such a sale.259
In Craft, the U.S. Supreme Court held that tenants by the entirety
have sufficient individual rights to property to cause the property to fall
within the reach of federal tax liens.26 ° Majority shareholders in closely
held corporations have essentially the same individual rights to corporate
property as tenants have to entireties property. 26' Therefore, a court
conceivably could extend the Craft holding to allow the Internal
Revenue Service to place liens on corporate property to collect
delinquent taxes from a majority shareholder.
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Craft, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
federal tax liens could reach property held as tenants by the entirety in
situations where only one spouse had failed to pay delinquent federal
taxes. The decision unnecessarily failed to follow the unanimous
opinion of the lower federal courts and the consistent position of the
Internal Revenue Service that entireties property was beyond the reach
of the federal tax lien statute in those circumstances.
The Court decided instead to extend the line of cases where
property and rights to property were not defined by state-law legal
fictions to those situations where a taxpayer never possessed the
property under state law. Unfortunately that decision will penalize
families in which only one parent generates income. Also, the Court's
reasoning could be extended to allow federal tax liens to reach property
owned by partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies,
and closely held corporations, unfairly penalizing the innocent coowners of these entities.
Wade M. Fisher
257 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
258 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1991).
259 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (1991) (noting that shareholders elect the
directors). Presumably the majority shareholder could serve as the only director). See MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(a) (1984) (indicating that a board of directors may consist of only one person).
260 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1426.
261 See supra notes 232 through 259 and accompanying text.
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